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Sentencing Guidelines for the Court
of Public Opinion: An Analysis of the
National Football League's Revised
Personal Conduct Policy
ABSTRACT

The National Football League (NFL) is considered to be the
premier professional sports league in the United States, if not the
world. In order to maintain that prominence, it is necessary for the
NFL to address circumstances that may arise periodically that could
have a deleterious effect on league revenues. Throughout the history of
the NFL, initiatives taken to safeguard its continued prosperity have
been within the province of the NFL Commissioner. The behavior of
NFL players, whether on the playing field or in their personal lives,
presents one such threat to the league's financial success. In the area of
player discipline, the Commissioner has the authority to punish
players for "conduct detrimental to the integrity of, or public confidence
in, the game of professional football." It was under this authority that
the current NFL Commissioner, Roger Goodell, enacted a new personal
conduct policy to be applied to all employees of the NFL. While the
previous policy required a conviction or its equivalent before discipline
was imposed for conduct occurring away from the playing field, the
new policy disposes of this requirement and empowers the
Commissioner to punish "[c]onduct that undermines or puts at risk the
integrity and reputationof the NFL, NFL clubs, or NFL players."
This Note first examines the relevant provisions of the NFL's
revised personal conduct policy and the reactions to its
implementation. It then considers the history of the office of NFL
Commissioner, the league documents establishing the scope of his
authority, and the treatment of commissioner authority in other
professional sports leagues. Finally, this Note evaluates the new
personal conduct policy in relation to the scope of the authority granted
to the NFL Commissioner and offers a solution capable of alleviating
the problems posed by the scope and applicationof the policy.
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"[T]he one thing we can't forget is that this game was built and made popular by
the players. We owe them everything."
- Bert Bell, National Football League Commissioner, 1946-19591

The American public is bombarded on a daily basis with the
most lurid details of celebrities' lives. 2 Realistically, there is no
escaping this fact unless you are willing to completely avoid contact
with all media outlets. It does not matter whether you are watching
CNN or walking through the checkout line at the grocery-this
tabloid-style journalism is easy to find. 3 Legal issues, relationship
woes, and personal tragedies are occurrences that the average
American will face throughout his or her lifetime with little fanfare,
but the moment that Britney Spears or Tom Cruise becomes involved
in a similar incident, it becomes a matter of public concern. 4 This
celebrity fixation, however, is not limited to entertainers; athletes'
5
lives are scrutinized in much the same way.
The media-driven saturation of our country with celebrity
gossip has the capacity to shape and control the way that the public

ROGER L. TREAT, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF FOOTBALL 681 (Suzanne Treat ed.,
1.
12th rev. ed. 1974).

2.
See, e.g., Britney Hospitalized, NATIONAL ENQUIRER, Jan. 31, 2008,
http://www.nationalenquirer.com/britney-hospital-mental-hold/celebrity/64514.
3.
See, e.g., Court: Britney Spears'DadHas Temporary Control, RestrainingOrder
Against Manager Sam Lutfi, FOXNEWS.COM, Feb. 1, 2008, http://www.foxnews.com/
story/0,2933,327469,00.html.
4.
See generally supra,notes 1-2.
5.
See, e.g., Jessica Simpson and Tony Romo's PDA-Packed Dinner,
USMAGAZINE.COM, Jan. 29, 2008, http://www.usmagazine.com/node/14915; US Exclusive:
Tom Brady and Bridget Moynahan Split, USMAGAZINE.COM, Dec. 14, 2006,
http://www.usmagazine.com/us exclusivetombrady-and-bridget-moynahan-split.

NFL'S PERSONAL CONDUCTPOLICY

2008]

views these famous people.6 In no area is the impact of the press more
profound than in criminal matters.7 The United States criminal
justice system is established in such a way that an alleged criminal is
to be considered innocent until proven guilty in a court of law.8
However, depending upon how the facts are reported and which side
receives greater attention, the populace can be led to believe that a
celebrity is in fact guilty until proven innocent. 9 The mass media has
exclusive jurisdiction in this court of public opinion and can effectively
ruin a person's reputation for life.10
Whenever public figures are under fire from the media, it is not
only their reputations that are harmed, but also those of their
employers, business partners, and sponsors.'1
The "guilty until
proven innocent" mentality can often lead to celebrities being
completely abandoned by those who once supported them and who had
once profited from their talents. 12 This fact is the result of the oftenheld belief that a squeaky-clean image is a prerequisite for commercial
success.13

During the 2006-07 season, the National Football League
(NFL) was faced with the decision to either stand by its players or
safeguard its reputation, and it ultimately chose the latter.1 4 This
6.

See Posting of Killfile to Newsvine.com, http://killfile.newsvine.com/_news/

2007/08/28/926897-trial-by-media-vick-lohan-and-the-court-of-public-opinion
(Aug.
28,
2007, 11:06 EDT).
7.
See, e.g., Posting of Emma Coleman Jordan to Georgetown Law Faculty Blog,
http://gulcfac.typepad.com/georgetown-university-law/2006/06/the-virtueof-p.html
(June
15, 2006).
8.
See, e.g., Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895) ("The principle that
there is a presumption of innocence in favor of the accused is the undoubted law, axiomatic
and elementary, and its enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our
criminal law.").
9.
See Frank Salvato, Guilty Until Proven Innocent, THE NEW MEDIA JOURNAL,
Nov. 19, 2004, http://www.therant.us/staff/fsalvato/2004/guilty-until_proven-innocent.htm.
10.
See, e.g., Killfile, supra note 6.
11.
See, e.g., Richard Sandomir, In Endorsements, No Athlete Is a Sure Thing, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 1, 2007, at D5, (quoting 16W Marketing partner Frank Vuono's statement
that, in the context of endorsements, "'a lot of times, perception is reality."'), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/01/sports/football/O lsandomir.html?-r=l&oref=slogin.
12.
See, e.g., Rawlings Drops Vick As Sponsor, ESPN.cOM, July 31, 2007,
http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=2956362 ('Rawlings recognizes that Mr. Vick
has not been convicted of the charges stemming from his recent indictment,' the St. Louis
company said. 'However, we have determined that ending our relationship with Mr. Vick at
this time is necessary."').
13.
See Sandomir, supra note 11 ('What gets lost in the concern about a rush to
judgment is that while there may be legal concerns, marketing-wise, you have to shoot first
and ask questions later. You have to build a moat around your brand."' (quoting David
Carter, principal of the Sports Business Group)).
14.
See generally Mark Maske & Les Carpenter, Player Arrests Put the NFL in a
Defensive Mode: High Number Alarms League As It Works to Protect Its Image, WASH.
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decision was prompted by a yearlong public relations nightmare that
resulted from the sports media's constant coverage of NFL players'
legal issues. 15 Previously, many inside the NFL had thought that the
16
character of its players was not as important as their level of talent.
Marvin Lewis, the head coach of the Cincinnati Bengals, exemplified
this way of thinking, as his choice of troubled yet talented players
changed the franchise from a perennial loser to a Super Bowl
contender. 17 Gambles of this sort can only pay off for so long, however,
and in 2006, the Bengals' luck ran out as nine players on their roster
were arrested in just a nine-month period (six of whom had been
drafted within the previous two years).1 ' One of those players, wide
receiver Chris Henry, had been arrested four times in three different
states in only a fourteen-month period.1 9 Another example of a
talented but troubled player is Adam "Pacman" Jones, then of the
Tennessee Titans, and the most publicized ne'er-do-well of the NFL,
who police had interviewed on ten separate occasions during the two
years before his eventual suspension from the NFL in April 2007.20
Terry "Tank" Johnson, then of the Chicago Bears, was arrested2 1three
times in an eighteen-month span, completing this list of infamy.
The barrage of bad press caused by these off-the-field incidents
put many veteran players on the defensive regarding the character of

POST, Dec. 16, 2006, at A01, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/
content/article/2006/12/15/AR2006121502134.html.

15.

See id.

16.

See generally Bernie Wilson & Teresa Walker, NFL Teams on Notice: Character

Counts, ESPN, Apr. 25, 2007, http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/wire?section=nfl&id=2849275.
17.
See id. ("The Cincinnati Bengals are the best example of how draft-day risks
can deflate a franchise.").
See id.
18.
See Jarrett Bell, Conduct Unbecoming: NFL Sets New Standard With
19.
Suspensions, USA TODAY.COM, Apr. 10, 2007, http://www.usatoday.com/sports/
football/nfl/2007-04-10-pacman-henry-suspensionsN.htm.
Goodell Strengthens NFL Personal Conduct Policy, USATODAY.COM, Apr. 11,
20.
http://www.usatoday.com/sports/football/nfl/2007-04- 10-new-conduct-policyN.htm
2007,
Cf. Patrick Hruby, Don't Mock Our League, ESPN.COM, Feb. 28, 2007,
?csp=34.
http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/page2/story?page=hruby/070227 (commenting on the effect
of Adam "Pacman" Jones' behavior on the NFL's "three strikes" policy; Posting of Cheryl
Thompson to Black Voices Blog, http:/fblackvoices.aol.comlblogs/2007/02/26/it-s-officialmake-it-rain-is-the-new-bling-bling (Feb. 26, 2007, 15:17 EST). (explaining that "making it
rain" is "when you throw [money] on [exotic dancers] in such a manner that you are
creating the effect of raining money.").
See Chicago's Tank Johnson Pleads Not Guilty to Weapons Charges,
21.
USATODAY.COM, Jan. 10, 2007, http://www.usatoday.comlsports/football/nflfbears/2007-0109-johnson-plea_x.htm; see also Officials: Arrest Violated Johnson's Probation,ESPN.coM,
Dec. 20, 2006, http://sports.espn.go.comlnfl/news/story?id=2704086; America's Favorite
3,
2007,
Feb.
ESPN.CoM,
Trouble,
Off-the-Field
Has
Still
Sport
http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/wire?section=nfl&id=2752782.
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the NFL as a whole. 22 In response to the outcry from players, coaches,
23
and owners, NFL Commissioner Roger Goodell felt compelled to act.
He met with Gene Upshaw, 24 who was then the executive director of
the National Football League Players' Association (NFLPA),25 and
created a six-man advisory panel to discuss player conduct and
discipline. 26 The result of these deliberations was the creation of a
27
new personal conduct policy.
This Note will address the legal issues raised by the different
provisions of the new policy and the manner in which Commissioner
Goodell has applied the new policy in different cases. Part I details
the provisions of the policy, how punishments received under it
compare to previous disciplinary actions, and the response to its
implementation.
Part II considers the history of the NFL
commissioner's office, the scope of his disciplinary authority, and the
degree of deference accorded to commissioners in other sports leagues.
Lastly, Part III analyzes the provisions of the policy in relation to the
scope of the commissioner's authority and proposes a solution capable
of alleviating some of the dilemmas created by its application.

I. THE NFL's NEW PERSONAL CONDUCT POLICY
The NFL's previous conduct policy, instituted by Commissioner
Goodell's predecessor, Paul Tagliabue, required a commissioner to
reserve judgment until the criminal justice system had run its
course. 28 As such, punishments were not imposed until after a player
had received either a conviction or its equivalent, such as a plea of no
contest or a plea to a lesser charge. 29 However, this policy precluded

22.
See generally Jemele Hill, The Pacman Jones Rule is Overdue, ESPN.cOM, Feb.
27, 2007, http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/page2/story?page=hill/070227.
23.
See id; see also Players Suggest 'Three Strikes' Rule at Meeting, ESPN.CoM,
Feb. 23, 2007, http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=2776549 (noting that many
players were calling for a hard-line approach to discipline prior to Goodell's policy
modifications).
24.
See Goodell Strengthens NFL PersonalConduct Policy, supra note 20.
25.
The NFLPA is the labor union for professional football players in the NFL. See
NFL Players Association - About Us, http://www.nflplayers.com/user/about-us.aspx
?fmid=182&lmid=182&pid=O&type=l (last visited Sept. 25, 2008).
26.
See Goodell Strengthens NFL Personal Conduct Policy, supra note 20.
27.

See NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE, PERSONAL CONDUCT POLICY, available at

http://blogmedia.thenewstribune.com/media/Personal%20Conduct%2OPolicy.pdf

(last

visited Sept. 25, 2008) [hereinafter CONDUCT POLICY].

28.
Posting of Professor Rick Karcher to Sports Law Blog, http://sportslaw.blogspot.com/2007/04/does-nfls-new-personal-conduct-policy.html (Apr. 18, 2007, 09:45
EST) [hereinafter Karcher].
29.
Id.
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swift action and was thus apparently viewed as insufficient in quelling
the rise in incidences of player misconduct and protecting the public
30
image of the NFL.
The new personal conduct policy, instituted in April 2007,
demands accountability for the actions of "[aill persons associated
with the NFL."3 1 Contrary to the previous policy, it expressly states
32
that it is no longer enough to "avoid being found guilty of a crime."
Instead, "as an employee of the NFL or a member club, [one is to be]
held to a higher standard and expected to conduct [himself or herself]
in a way that is responsible, promotes the values upon which the
[NFL] is based, and is lawful." 33 Furthermore, "[p]ersons who fail to
live up to this standard of conduct are guilty of conduct detrimental
and subject to discipline, even where the conduct itself does not result
in conviction of a crime."'34
The new policy also articulates
circumstances that will give rise to disciplinary action, the most
notable being "[c]onduct that undermines or puts at risk the integrity
and reputation of the NFL, NFL clubs, or NFL players."35 Once a
violation has occurred, the commissioner is given the power to impose
full "discipline as warranted." 36 The severity of the punishment varies
in proportion to "the nature of the incident, the actual or threatened
risk to the participant and others, any prior or additional misconduct
(whether or not criminal charges were filed), and other relevant
37
factors."

30.

See generally Barry

Wilner,

Goodell Gets Tough,

Protects NFL Brand,

USATODAY.COM, Apr. 10, 2007, http://www.usatoday.com/sports/football/2007-04-102350024441_x.htm.
31.
See CONDUCT POLICY, supra note 27.
32.
See id.
33.
Id. (underline in original).
34.
Id.
35.
Id. Other offenses punishable under the policy include criminal offenses in
general, "[c]riminal offenses relating to steroids and prohibited substances," "[v]iolence or
threatening behavior among employees," "possession of a gun or other weapon in any
workplace setting," and "[clonduct that imposes inherent danger to the safety and well
being of another person." Id. (underline in original).
36.
Id. It further clarifies that "[d]iscipline may take the form of fines, suspension,
or banishment from the League and may include. . . conditions that must be satisfied prior
to or following reinstatement." Id.
37.
Id. (emphasis added). It does note that unless a first-time offense involves
"significant bodily harm," it will generally not warrant disciplinary action. Id. However,
"the commissioner may impose discipline on an expedited basis for [subsequent violators]
who have [already] been assigned a probationary period." Id. For repeat offenders, the
degree of punishment is to be a factor of "the severity of the initial charge and later charge;
the facts underlying the later charge; the length of time between the initial offense and
later charge; and the player or employee's compliance with counseling and other
programs." Id.
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With the new policy in place, the commissioner wasted little
time in handing down suspensions. 38 Despite the lack of a conviction,
Jones was suspended for the entire 2006-07 season without pay and
was issued specific conditions that would need to be met before he
would be eligible for reinstatement. 39 Additionally, Henry 40 and
Johnson were both suspended for the first eight games of the 2006-07
41
season and also were given prerequisites for their reinstatement.
To put the true harshness of these disciplinary actions into
perspective, consider the case of Albert Haynesworth of the Tennessee
Titans. In October 2006 Haynesworth received only a five-game
suspension for repeatedly stomping on the head of Andre Gurode of
the Dallas Cowboys, who was at the time lying on the ground without
his helmet.4 2 This suspension was the longest in NFL history for onthe-field misconduct-before the Haynesworth incident, no player had
ever been suspended for more than four games. 43 An even more
noticeable disparity in punishments can be discerned from the fact
that in 2006, Chris Henry had been suspended by Commissioner
Goodell under the previous policy for only two games following a
string of arrests and other legal troubles-if the new policy had been
44
applied, he would have been suspended for eight.

38.
See Bell, supra note 19. It bears noting that Jones and Henry were technically
suspended prior to the new policy being implemented, but the statements of the
commissioner made it clear that they were suspended for harming the league's reputation,
which was not punishable under the previous policy. See generally id. ('What the hell rule
did he break?"') (quoting Warren Sapp's reaction after being told that Goodell "invoked
'conduct detrimental to the game' powers.").
39.
Id; see also Goodell Suspends Pacman, Henry for Multiple Arrests, ESPN.COM,
May 17, 2007, http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=2832015 (listing the conditions
for Jones's reinstatement).
40.
See Bell, supranote 19. Unlike Jones, Henry had been sentenced to ninety days
in jail (though all but two days of his sentence were suspended). Id.
41.
Johnson Suspended for Eight Games: Can Be Reduced to Six, ESPN.COM, June
5, 2007,
http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=2892889
[hereinafter
Johnson
Suspended]. However, unlike Jones, Johnson was actually convicted and had, in fact, just
been released from jail when the Commissioner suspended him. Id.
42.
See Haynesworth Suspended for UnprecedentedFive Games, ESPN.COM, Oct. 3,
2006, http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=2610577. Haynesworth, who is 6 feet 6
inches tall and weighs 320 pounds, was wearing cleats when the incident occurred, and
could have possibly left Gurode with permanent brain trauma or worse, but, luckily for
Gurode, he only needed thirty stitches to mend the gash. See generally id.
43.
See Mark Maske, NFL, Players are Expected to Agree on Conduct Policy, WASH.
POST, Mar. 15, 2007, at E03, available at http://www.washingtonpost.comlwpdyncontent/article/2007/03/14/AR2007031402709.html.
44.
See id.; see also Bengals' Henry Is Suspended Two Games for Substance-Abuse
Violation, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2006, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/07
/sports/football/07nfl.html?_r=l&scp=l&sq=bengals%20henry&st=cse&oref=slogin.
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Almost the entire NFL has expressed support for the policy and
its "get tough" stand regarding off-the-field misbehavior. 45 Tony
Dungy, head coach of the Indianapolis Colts, noted that merely fining
players and teams is rarely sufficient to deter this behavior, but "when
you start talking about playing time and draft picks, that seems to
get" the attention of players and teams. 46 Even teammates of the
suspended players have agreed with the commissioner's actions,
viewing them as necessary to prevent future negative publicity and
47
give the NFL a better image.
However, the policy has not received unanimous approval from
all those within the league, as concerns have been voiced regarding its
application and reach. 48 ESPN analyst, and former NFL player,
Keyshawn Johnson was troubled by its expansive scope and potential
for double standards: "What happens if a coach, [general manager] or
owner gets a DUI? Then what? What if an ex-NFL player throws
himself through a window in Miami? That still reflects on the NFL's
image. '49 Dan Jiggetts, a former vice president of the NFLPA, echoed
Johnson's concerns, cautioning that the commissioner's disciplinary
actions, while seemingly well intentioned, could very well cross the
line from improving the NFL to actually impinging upon players'
rights. 50 Furthermore, after Jones' suspension was imposed, the
NFLPA sent a letter to the commissioner criticizing his choice of
punishment. 51 The union's letter admonished the commissioner for
punishing Jones in a manner that was both "excessive and
52
inconsistent with the treatment of other similarly situated players."

45.
See Bell, supra note 19; Len Pasquarelli, Goodell Plays the Role of New Sheriff
in Town Perfectly, ESPN.COM,
Apr. 10,
2007,
http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl
/columns/story?columnist=pasquarelli len&id=2832237; Goodell's Policy Gets Support from
Around the NFL, ESPN.COM, Apr. 11, 2007, http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/wire?section
=nfl&id=2832917.
46.
Goodell Strengthens NFL Personal Conduct Policy, supra note 20.
47.
Id. ('With all of the things that have been happening recently, I think it will be
good and hopefully give the league a little better image.") (quoting Carson Palmer, Chris
Henry's teammate).
48.
See Bell, supra note 19.
49.
See id.
50.
David Haugh, Release - With a Catch, CHI. TRIB., May 16, 2007, at C10 ("It's
one thing that he's trying to clean up the league and everybody understands that, but he
can't be making unilateral decisions." (quoting Dan Jiggetts)).
51.

Jim Wyatt, Players Union Rallies to Pacman, THE TENNESSEAN, May 30, 2007,

at lA.
52.
Id. (quoting letter from NFL Players Association to Commissioner Roger
Goodell (May 23, 2007)); see also Posting of Rick Karcher to Sports Law Blog, http://sportslaw.blogspot.com/2007/05/nflpa-sends-stern-message-to-nfl.html (May 30, 2007, 8:05 EST)
(interpreting the NFLPA's letter to be a statement by the union that while it agreed to this
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II. COMMISSIONER AUTHORITY
A. The NFL Commissioner
The NFL, like most other professional sports leagues, operates
under a system of government that "allocates significant authority to
one person, the league commissioner." 53 In determining the extent of
this authority, it is necessary to consider both the motives behind the
creation of the commissioner's office and the governing documents
that outline the commissioner's powers and responsibilities. 54 It is
best to first look at the historical background of the commissioner's
office, as history presumably shaped the provisions of the governing
documents and, as such, aids in the interpretation of ambiguous terms
55
in the new policy.
Throughout its history, the NFL has experienced a rich
tradition of management stability that is somewhat anomalous for a
business of its size and caliber. 56 This legacy began when Joe Carr
took over the role of commissioner in 1921, a time when the NFL was
in its infancy and far from the staple of American culture that it has
since become. 57 His firm adherence to a policy forbidding teams from
employing college players until after they had graduated and his lack
of tolerance towards teams who broke NFL rules helped the NFL
new policy, there was an implied understanding that punishments would be imposed in a
manner consistent with that of the previous commissioner).
53.
JOHN C. WEISTART & CYM H. LOWELL, THE LAW OF SPORTS § 4.19, at 440 (1979)
[hereinafter LAW OF SPORTS].
54.
See Matthew B. Pachman, Note, Limits on the Discretionary Powers of
Professional Sports Commissioners:A Historicaland Legal Analysis of Issues Raised by the
Pete Rose Controversy, 76 VA. L. REV. 1409, 1413 (1990).
55.
See id.
56.
See Matthew Boyle, The NFL, Post-Tagliabue, FORTUNE, Aug. 7, 2006 at 16
(noting that the NFL has had only three leaders since 1946 as opposed to General Electric's
seven leaders in that same time period).
57.
See, e.g., TREAT, supra note 1, at 679; Pachman, supra note 54, at 1417 n.55
("Carr took control at a time when the league was unstable in terms of both membership
and finances."); see also ROBERT C. BERRY, WILLIAM B. GOULD, IV & PAUL D. STAUDOHAR,
LABOR RELATIONS IN PROFESSIONAL SPORTS 89 (1986) ("It was still a shaky enterprise,
with one game between the New York Giants and the Chicago Bears drawing only eighty
customers."). Jim Thorpe was actually the first president of the American Professional
Football Association, which would later become the NFL, but he was only in his position for
one year before being replaced by Joe Carr. NFL History By Decade, 1911-1920,
http://www.nfl.com/history/chronology/1911-1920 (last visited Sept. 26, 2008); NFL History
By Decade, 1921-1930, http://www.nfl.com/history/chronology/1921-1930 (last visited Sept.
26, 2008). Carr's title was technically "president," but the title makes little difference, as
his function was equivalent to that of a commissioner. See Pachman, supra note 54, at 1417
n.55. The title was officially changed in 1941. Id.
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survive this early growing period. 58 Bert Bell, who became the
commissioner in 1946, designed and implemented the NFL's policy on
television broadcasting and, in doing so, helped to make professional
football the "fastest growing sport in the United States."5 9 However, it
was not until Pete Rozelle, who became the commissioner in 1960,
successfully negotiated the merger between the NFL and its
competitor, the American Football League, that the NFL's limitless
potential became clear. 60 Paul Tagliabue continued this chain of
outstanding leadership throughout his seventeen years as
commissioner from 1989 to 2006, a period "marked by soaring
franchise values, peaceful labor relations, and lucrative television
deals."6 1 Ultimately, the combined efforts of these men paved the way
62
for the prominence and prosperity that the league enjoys today.
Roger Goodell, who has served as the NFL's commissioner
since 2006, has been entrusted with the lofty duty of not only
63
continuing but also protecting the legacy started by these great men.
Accomplishing this task requires that he have the power to punish
those in violation of NFL rules, but, as with all of the commissioner's
powers, this power is limited to that which he has been affirmatively
granted.6 4 The NFL commissioner's disciplinary authority is defined
by three documents: the Constitution and By-laws of the National
Football League (League Constitution),6 5 the Collective Bargaining
67
Agreement (CBA), 66 and the NFL's standard player contract (SPK).
58.
59.

TREAT, supra note 1, at 679.
at 681 (quoting TEX MAULE, THE PROS (1960)). Elmer Layden was Carr's

Id.

direct successor but he only occupied the office for five years, after which time his contract
was not renewed. NFL History By Decade, 1941-1950, http://www.nfl.com
/history/chronology/1941-1950 (last visited Sept. 26, 2008).
60.
See TREAT, supra note 1, at 680.
61.
Boyle, supra note 56. See also Geoffrey Colvin, Lessons from the Commish,
FORTUNE, Apr. 17, 2006, at 65 (noting that Tagliabue "[held] his job for seventeen years
and then [left] to universal acclaim.").
62.
See Colvin, supra note 61 (noting that prior to Tagliabue's retirement, "league
revenues [were] estimated at over $6 billion, making the NFL America's largest sports
business by far.").
63.
See Judy Battista, Goodell Gets Enough Votes to Lead N.F.L., N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
9, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/09/sports/football09nfl.html.
64.
LAW OF SPORTS, supra note 53, § 3.15(a), at 307-08 ("[The commissioner has] no
authority to take actions which are not either authorized in or reasonably implied from the
terms of the relevant documents. To the extent that [the commissioner] take[s] actions
beyond those explicitly or implicitly authorized, [his] decisions . . . have no validity."
(footnote omitted)).
65.
CONSTITUTION AND BY-LAws OF THE NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE, art. VIII, §
8.13(A), as reprinted in 1 Robert C. Berry & Glenn M. Wong, LAW AND BUSINESS OF THE
SPORTS INDUSTRIES 511 (1986) [hereinafter LEAGUE CONST.].
66.
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE NFL MANAGEMENT
COUNCIL AND THE NFL PLAYERS ASSOCIATION, March 6, 2006, art. XI, §1(a) available at
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The League Constitution is the "contract which defines the
respective powers of the league and its component clubs."6 8 It states
that the commissioner has the authority to impose disciplinary
measures against a player or coach who has "violated the Constitution
or by-laws of the [NFL], or has been or is guilty of conduct detrimental
to the welfare of the [NFL] or professional football." 69 Though this
grant of authority is expansive, the League Constitution implicitly
limits the commissioner's punitive powers by noting that if he should
determine that the punishment he could impose under his explicit
authority is insufficient or inadequate, he can then refer the matter to
the Executive Committee to decide upon his recommendation to
70
impose additional punishment.
While the League Constitution establishes the framework for
the operation of the NFL, 7 1 the CBA codifies the reciprocal transfer of
power between the players and the league. 72 The CBA expressly
states that the commissioner's disciplinary authority is one of the
rights given to the commissioner by the players. 73 The SPK, which
has been incorporated into the CBA, is the means through which the
individual players consent to this grant of authority. 74 As for the
http://www.nflplayers.com/user/template.aspx?fmid=l18&lmid=23 1&pid=533&type=c
[hereinafter CBA].
67.
See id. app. C, §15.
68.
See LAW OF SPORTS, supra note 53, § 3.15 at 307.
69.
LEAGUE CONST, supra note 65, at art. VIII, §8.13(A).
70.
See id. at art. VIII, § 8.13(B); see also Pachman, supra note 54, at 1418 (noting
that requiring the NFL Commissioner to obtain the consent of the Executive Committee
prior to imposing discipline that is beyond his express power represents a "significant
departure" from the powers of his baseball counterpart). The Executive Committee's
purpose is to manage and transact "the business and affairs of the NFLPA between
meetings of the Board of Player Representatives." NFL Players Association,
,http://www.nflplayers.com/user/template.aspx?fmid=182&lmid=240&pid=O&type=l
(last
visited Sept. 26, 2008).
71.
See supra text accompanying note 69.
72.
See generally LAW OF SPORTS, supra note 53, § 6.01 at 778 ("The terms and

conditions under which athletes perform now may be determined in the give and take of
the collective bargaining process.
...). Although a collective bargaining agreement had
been signed in 1968, the NFLPA successfully negotiated the NFL's current CBA in 1993
and then amended it in 2006, with the current version of the CBA governing the sport until
2011.
See
NFL
Players
Association,
http://www.nflplayers.com/user/aboutus.aspx?fmid=182&lmid=182&pid=O&type=l (last visited Sept. 26, 2008).
73.
CBA, supra note 66.
74.
Id. at app. C, §15; see also Matthew McKelvey, Note, Separating Sports and
Real Life: How Professional Sports Leagues' Collective Bargaining Agreements Keep
Athletes Out of the Criminal Justice System, 27 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV.
CONFINEMENT 91, 98 (2001) ('The inclusion of contract provisions wherein the player
agrees that he may be fined or suspended for certain conduct is designed to make the
discipline not only legal, but, in fact a recognized part of the player's bargain with his team
and the league."' (quoting 1 MARTIN J. GREENBERG & JAMES T. GRAY, SPORTS LAW
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scope of the commissioner's disciplinary authority, the CBA explains
that the commissioner is vested with the power to punish two types of
conduct: (1) conduct occurring on the playing field; and (2) conduct
that is "detrimental to the integrity of, or public confidence in, the
game of professional football." 7 5 It also limits the recourse of any
player disciplined by the commissioner by stating that a player may
only appeal to the commissioner or his designee and that any
discipline imposed "may only be affirmed, reduced or vacated by the
76
commissioner."
Collective bargaining agreements, such as that of the NFL,
establish a system of "industrial self-government" that covers the
"whole employment relationship" 77 and calls into being a new common
law: "the common law of a particular industry."7 8 Thus, while the
League Constitution will provide helpful guidance in interpreting the
commissioner's authority, the CBA is the "supreme governing
authority" concerning employment with the NFL. 79 Because the new
policy has not been incorporated into the CBA, its legitimacy is
dependent upon whether the application of its provisions is consistent
with the authority already granted to the commissioner. However, the
scope of the commissioner's disciplinary authority has never been

PRACTICE 1221 (2d ed. 1998))). In making this consent, the players are to recognize "the

detriment to the league and professional football that would result from impairment of
public confidence in the honest and orderly conduct of NFL games or the integrity and good
character of NFL players." CBA, supra note 66, at app. C, §15 (emphasis added).
Additionally, the "Integrity of the Game" section of the SPK categorizes specific conduct as
punishable by the commissioner. Id. ("[A player will be subject to discipline if he] accepts a
bribe or agrees to throw or fix an NFL game; fails to promptly report a bribe offer or an
attempt to throw or fix an NFL game; bets on an NFL game; knowingly associates with
gamblers or gambling activity; uses or provides other players with stimulants or other
drugs for the purpose of attempting to enhance on-field performance; or is guilty of any
other form of conduct reasonably judged by the [NFL] Commissioner to be detrimental to
the league or professional football.") (emphasis added). It further notes that "the
commissioner will have the right, but only after giving [the] player the opportunity for a
hearing at which he may be represented by counsel of his choice, to fine [the] player in a
reasonable amount; to suspend [the] player for a period certain or indefinitely; and/or to
terminate this contract." Id.
75.
CBA, supra note 66, at art. XI, § 1(a).
76.
Id. at art. XI, § 1(c) (emphasis added).
77.
United Steelworkers of Amer. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574,
579-80 (1960).
78.
Consol. Rail Corp. v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 491 U.S. 299, 312 (1989).
79.
Jan Stiglitz, Player Discipline in Team Sports, 5 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 167, 173
(1995). Though it is not at issue here, in the event of a conflict between the League
Constitution and the CBA, "the collective bargaining agreement, under labor law
principles, takes precedence." ROBERT C. BERRY & GLENN M. WONG, 1 LAW AND BUSINESS
OF THE SPORTS INDUSTRIES, 510 (1986).
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challenged.8 0 Nonetheless, the disciplinary powers possessed by the
commissioners of other professional sports leagues have been
subjected to scrutiny and, as such, provide guidance as to how the
8
NFL commissioner's authority should be construed. '
B. Treatment of Commissioner Discretion in Other Leagues
Challenges
to
the
Major
League
Baseball
(MLB)
commissioner's authority provide the best examples of the degree of
judicial deference afforded to professional sports league commissioners
under their respective "best interests" clauses.8 2 It has been said that
the circumstances and agreements surrounding the office of the
commissioner of baseball evidence a clear intent to "endow the
commissioner with all the attributes of a benevolent but absolute
despot and all the disciplinary powers of the proverbial pater
familias."8 3 Because the judiciary grants the baseball commissioner a
highly deferential standard of review when evaluating his actions, the
commissioner has nearly unlimited discretion as long as his actions
are not "arbitrary or capricious, or motivated by malice, ill will or
anything other than the commissioner's good faith judgment [that the
84
actions in question] were not in the best interests of' the sport.
Charles 0. Finley & Co. v. Kuhn provides the leading example
of the generous degree of deference afforded to the MLB
commissioner.8 5 In that case, a team owner attempted to sell three of
his best players to the highest bidder, but the commissioner voided the
80.
This is likely a result of the appeal provisions that would greatly impede a
player's ability to challenge a decision made by the Commissioner.
See supra text
accompanying note 76.

81.
See discussion infra Part II.B.
82.
Milwaukee Amer. Ass'n v. Landis, 49 F.2d 298, 303 (N.D. Ill. 1931) ("[Tjhe
commissioner is given almost unlimited discretion in the determination of whether or not a
certain state of facts creates a situation detrimental to the national game of baseball."); see
also Matthew G. Conway, Sports Commissioners or Judges: Who Should Make The Call

When The Game is Over?, 24 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1043, 1049 (1990) ("In each of these
leagues there were commissioners and presidents presiding over the players, but nowhere
is the evolution of the commissioner's role better exemplified than in baseball.").
83.
Milwaukee Amer. Ass'n, 49 F.2d at 299.
84.
Charles 0. Finley & Co. v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527, 539 n.44 (7th Cir. 1978); see
also Milwaukee Amer. Ass'n, 49 F.2d at 303 ("As we have seen, the commissioner is given
almost unlimited discretion in the determination of whether or not a certain state of facts
creates a situation detrimental to the national game of baseball."); Jason M. Pollack, Note,
Take My Arbitrator, Please: Commissioner "Best Interests" Disciplinary Authority in
Professional Sports, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1645, 1690-91 (1999) ("As long as a league's
commissioner acted in accordance with the guidelines set forth in that agreement, courts
have not interfered with the commissioner's decisions, absent any arbitraryor capricious
actions.") (emphasis added).
85.
Charles 0. Finley & Co., 569 F.2d at 527.
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sales.8 6 Commissioner Bowie Kuhn claimed that these transactions
were not in the best interests of baseball because allowing them to
proceed would lead to a perception that only the richest teams could
compete in baseball, thereby discouraging the growth of the sport into
smaller markets.8 7 In finding that the commissioner had sufficient
authority to void these sales, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit considered the totality of the circumstances
surrounding the commissioner's
disciplinary authority, and
emphasized that this power was reflected in the commissioner's
previous exercises of similarly broad authority, amendments made to
broaden the commissioner's authority, and the explicit language of the
88
MLB agreement itself.
Even when there has been disparity in the punishments the
MLB commissioner has imposed for seemingly comparable offenses,
courts have remained deferential to the commissioner if there are even
slight distinctions between the offenses. 8 9 Atlanta Braves' owner Ted
Turner found this out the hard way when the commissioner suspended
him for one year for his involvement with negotiations concerning
potential free agents in violation of MLB rules, while another owner
who had committed a similar transgression was merely fined. 90 In
Atlanta National League Baseball Club v. Kuhn, the court sided with
the commissioner, noting that there were differences between the two
offenses (for example, Turner had already received six warnings) and
that with such differences present, "honest minds could, and indeed
do, disagree as to what is an appropriate punishment." 91
The MLB commissioner, however, has not been afforded
unbridled discretion by the courts. 92 In Atlanta National League
Baseball Club, for example, the court held that the commissioner was
limited in the punitive sanctions he could levy against an owner who
had violated the league's rules and directives. 93 The governing MLB
agreement enumerated a list of specific punitive measures that could
be utilized while at the same time offering no specific remedial or
86.
Id. at 531.
87.
Id.
88.
Cf. id. at 538-39. However, if the commissioner's actions had been arbitrary,
capricious, or made in bad faith, the court may not have been so deferential. See generally
id. at 539.
89.
See Atlanta Nat'l League Baseball Club, Inc. v. Kuhn, 432 F. Supp 1213, 1223
(N.D. Ga. 1977).
90.
Id. at 1222-23.
91.
Id. at 1223.
92.
Id. at 1226.
93.
432 F. Supp at 1226 (finding that the commissioner could suspend the owner
but could not take away the team's draft picks).
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The court rejected the
preventative actions he could take. 94
commissioner's argument that the list of punitive measures was
merely "illustrative rather than definitive" and refused to allow a
punishment that was not included among those specifically
95
mentioned.
Unlike the judiciary, arbitrators have not been nearly as
deferential to the judgments of commissioners. 96 In an arbitration
involving pitcher Steve Howe, the arbitrator found that the MLB
commissioner was "without just cause" in permanently banning Howe
from baseball for life. 97 The arbitrator determined that "no member of
the public could possibly think that the manner in which [drug
offenses had been previously disciplined] imperiled the integrity of the
game" such that a lifetime ban would be required. 98 Furthermore,
after National Basketball Association (NBA) superstar Latrell
Sprewell attacked and choked his coach, the NBA commissioner
suspended him for one year. 99 However, as with Howe, an arbitrator
reduced the suspension, noting that fairness should serve to "temper
commissioner-imposed discipline." 100 Thus, although it appears that
the judiciary uses an "arbitrary or capricious" standard of review for
commissioner actions, 10 1 these arbitration decisions articulate a more
flexible standard that would allow for equitable considerations to limit
10 2
the scope of a commissioner's powers.
III. ANALYSIS
Deference to commissioner authority in other professional
sports leagues provides helpful guidance and suggests that a fairly
broad interpretation of the NFL commissioner disciplinary power is
appropriate,10 3 but this power is not an all-encompassing one, and
Id. at 1224.
94.
95.
Id. at 1223-24, 1226 (explaining that if the commissioner is to have this
"unlimited punitive authority as he says is needed to deal with new and changing
situations," then the NBA agreement should be changed to reflect that need).
See generally Pollack, supra note 84, at 1691.
96.

Id.at 1696. This lifetime ban was not imposed until after Howe had been
97.
suspended from baseball six times for drug abuse. See id. at 1692.
Id. at 1695 (internal quotation omitted).
98.
99.
Id. at 1699-1700.
100.
Id. at 1700, 1703.
See supra text accompanying note 84.
101.
102.
See supra text accompanying notes 96-100; see also Pollack, supra note 84, at
1705 ("Arbitrators disregard applicable standards upon which to review commissioner
disciplinary decisions and merely impose the punishments which they view as fair.").
103.
See, e.g., Charles 0. Finley & Co. v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527, 539 n.44 (7th Cir.
1978).
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should not be interpreted as such. 10 4 This section first considers the
scope of the commissioner disciplinary authority (and its limitations),
and whether the provisions of the policy, in addition to the
10 5
punishments imposed under it, are consistent with those powers.
This section will then explain the problems with the policy and
propose an alteration to the NFL dispute resolution provisions that is
10 6
capable of eliminating, or at least alleviating, those concerns.
A. The Scope of Commissioner Goodell's Authority
The Collective Bargaining Agreement gives the commissioner
the power to reasonably judge that particular conduct is detrimental
to the "integrity of, or public confidence in," the NFL. 10 7 If the
provisions of the CBA are to be regarded as establishing the law
governing employment with the NFL, the commissioner's disciplinary
authority should not be interpreted in such a manner that would
exceed this grant.10 8 However, this still leaves open the question of
what precisely amounts to a detriment to "integrity and public
confidence."'' 0 9 The answer can be found by examining the role played
by the commissioner throughout NFL history." 0
Commissioner Joe Carr was appointed in the hope that he
would achieve financial stability for the NFL and pave the way for its
prosperity, and each commissioner to follow him has had his place in
history defined by his contribution to the financial success of the
NFL."'
This indicates that the intention of those who initially
granted the commissioner his power was that one of the
commissioner's priorities would be to maximize the NFL's bottom
line." 2 Thus, one could say that the array of powers afforded to the

104.

See THE LAW OF SPORTS supra note 53, § 3.15 at 306-07.

105.

See discussion infra Part III.A.

106.
See discussion infra Part III.B.
107.
See CBA, supra note 66, at art. XI, § 1(a); see also id. at app. C, §15.
108.
See Pachman, supra note 54, at 1420 ("A commissioner may not violate the
agreements that determine the scope of his office."); cf. Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Railway
Labor Executives' Ass'n, 491 U.S. 299, 311-12 (1989).
CBA, supra note 66, at art. XI, § 1(a).
109.
110.
See supra text accompanying notes 53-62; see also Pachman, supra note 54, at
1420 ("As in legislative interpretation ... the intentions of the league founders may [be
helpful] in determin[ing] the meaning of ambiguous phrases.").
111.
See supra text accompanying notes 56-62.
See id. It bears to note that the MLB commissioner's office was created in the
112.
wake of the "Black Sox" scandal in which eight members of the Chicago White Sox were
accused of accepting bribes from gamblers to throw the 1919 World Series. Pachman, supra
note 54, at 1414. The intention of the framers of the office was to give the commissioner
absolute power over discipline to clean up baseball's tarnished image. See id. at 1414-15.
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commissioner are merely tools to be utilized in order to achieve
financial gain; therefore, if the commissioner has been given the power
to discipline specific player conduct, it is likely the result of a belief
that such behavior will have a negative impact on the NFL's financial
position. In the world of modern sports, the success or failure of a
sports league is dependent upon the size of its fan base. Therefore,
behavior capable of negatively impacting the NFL's finances can be
best understood to be behavior that is likely to negatively affect the
league popularity. 113 In this regard, the phrase "conduct detrimental
to the integrity of, or public confidence in, the game of professional
football," as it appears in the CBA, 11 4 can be interpreted to encompass
any player behavior that is capable of negatively affecting league
revenues by causing a decrease in patronage and support for the NFL
and its players.
Employing this reasoning, it is not much of a logical leap to
conclude that the NFL's popularity would likely plummet if the NFL
was seen as acquiescing in or simply turning a blind eye to criminal
behavior. Most people are unlikely to support a sports organization
that permits its players to function as though they are above the law
simply because they are gifted athletes. Furthermore, this need to
punish criminal activity is illustrated by the history of players
disciplined for criminal actions provides confirmation of a common
understanding that punishing this behavior is within the
115
commissioner's authority.
As discussed previously, the new policy and actions taken
116
pursuant to it differ significantly from actions taken in the past.
For one thing, players were generally disciplined for off-the-field
behavior only if it was specifically prohibited by the SPK, such as

This distinguishes the NFL Commissioner from his counterpart in baseball, as the baseball
commissioner was empowered as a result of a need for a disciplinarian, while the NFL
Commissioner was empowered to, and has since continued to, serve a role more akin to
that of a financial officer. See id.
113.
This is manifested in the SPK where it expressly states that the "success of
professional football depends largely upon public respect for and approval of those
associated with the game." CBA, supra note 66, at app. C, §2; see also CONDUCT POLICY,
supra note 27, at 1 (stating that the new conduct policy seeks to punish conduct that
"undermines public respect and support for the NFL.").
114.
See CBA, supra note 66, at art. XI, § 1(a).
115.
See generally Memorandum from Mark G. Trigg, Greenberg Traurig, LLP, to
Adolfo A. Burch, III, Labor Relations Counsel, National Football League (May 1, 2007),
available at http://www.tennessean.com/assets/pdf/DN73135512.PDF (listing NFL players
disciplined for criminal activities) [hereinafter Greenberg Traurig].
116.
See generally Karcher, supra note 28.
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substance abuse or gambling. 7 If the behavior in question was not
covered in the SPK, the NFL did not impose discipline unless the
player had either been convicted of or pled guilty to criminal
charges. 118
Under the new policy, a less clear issue remains as to whether
the commissioner's disciplinary power may be used against players
who have not been convicted of a crime or found to be in violation of
any other specific NFL rules, such as Adam "Pacman" Jones.1 1 9 To say
that the NFL cannot condone criminal behavior is a far cry from
saying that it is free to punish its players for merely causing the NFL
to incur bad publicity that "sullies the reputation of others involved in
the game." 120 A judgment in the court of public opinion is often
binding in the minds of the American people, but that does not
automatically mean that the NFL should transcend fairness and
reason by simply confirming this judgment. Nonetheless, the reality
is that there may be times when protecting the future prosperity of
the NFL requires actions that might otherwise be deemed
unreasonable or unfair.
The determinative issue, therefore, is whether harm to the
NFL's reputation is capable of decreasing fan support for the
league.1 21 This must be evaluated through the eyes of the public,
which, for the purpose of business expansion, can be divided into three
classes: (1) those who are avid fans of the NFL; (2) those who are
occasional fans; and (3) those who are not currently fans, but who
could potentially become interested in the league. It is unlikely that

117.
See CBA, supra note 66, app. C, § 15; see also Clay Travis, NFL Punishment
Policy Straight
Out
of
Orwell, Apr.
23,
2007,
http://www.sportsline.com

/spinstory/10145009 [hereinafter Straight Out of Orwell] ('Usually these league
suspensions for off-of-the-field conduct boil down to two main areas. First, drugs or second,
gambling."'(quoting Vanderbilt University Law School Professor Robert Covington); cf.
Greenberg Traurig, supra note 115.
Though many believed that Michael Vick's
involvement with dog fighting was the reason for his suspension, he was in fact suspended
for gambling on dog-fighting, which is specifically prohibited in the SPK. See CBA, supra
note 66, at app. C, § 15; Michael S. Schmidt & Judy Battista, After Plea, Vick Is Given
Suspension by
the N.F.L.,
N.Y. TIMES,
Aug.
25, 2007,
available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/25/sports/football/25vick.html.
118.
Karcher, supra note 28.
119.
See CONDUCT POLICY, supra note 27; Bell, supra note 19 ("[Keyshawn] Johnson
and [Warren] Sapp . . .expressed bewilderment that Jones was disciplined before his legal
cases were resolved."); see also Clay Travis, Goodell's No Lawyer... So Why Take The Law
in His Own Hands?, CBS SPORTS, May 28, 2007, http://www.sportsline.com
/spin/story/10201015 [hereinafter Goodell's No Lawyer] (noting that "none of this bad news
surrounding [Jones] has resulted in a single conviction for him since he started receiving
paychecks from the Tennessee Titans.").
120.
See CONDUCT POLICY, supra note 27, at 1.
121.
See supra text accompanying note 113.
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bad publicity is going to change the opinion of avid fans; however, the
occasional or fair-weather fans may find the negative news stories
disheartening, which could cause these fans to lose interest altogether.
For those who are not fans, it is not at all unrealistic to assume that
they could be dissuaded from ever embracing the sport if they were to
see the NFL completely ignoring the character of its players and their
irresponsible actions. 122 Moreover, it bears repeating that it is not as
though the public can easily remain unaware of these actions, as one
can learn about the latest exploits of professional athletes from a
variety of mass media sources. 123 This combination of easily accessible
information and a potentially negative impact on the size of the NFL's
fan base could be viewed as a viable threat to the NFL's financial
position, sufficient to come within the ambit of the integrity and public
24
confidence clause of the CBA.1
Contrarily, one could always point out that Adam "Pacman"
Jones and the other players involved in the scandals of the 2006-07
1 25
season did not single-handedly tarnish the good name of the NFL.
Indeed, the NFL is no stranger to bad publicity. 126 In 2000, for
example, future Hall of Fame linebacker Ray Lewis was accused of
and tried for murder, although the charges were later dropped. 127 At
the time of his legal troubles, Lewis was considered one of the best
and most popular players in the NFL, and, consequently, his trial
received significantly more media attention than that given to, for
example, the Adam "Pacman" Jones' debacle in Las Vegas and other
exploits, who was at the time only in his third year in league. 28

122.
This is especially true for the large number of people who are not fans of
professional sports in general because they view professional athletes as more focused on

making an inordinate amount of money than on playing the game to the best of their
ability.
123.
See supra text accompanying notes 2-3.
124.
See supra text accompanying note 113; see also Bell, supra note 19 ('There are
a lot of choices out there for people to be entertained or have business relationships with."'
(quoting New England Patriots' owner Robert Kraft)).
125.

See, e.g., JEFF BENEDICT & DON YAEGER, PROS AND CONS: THE CRIMINALS WHO

PLAY IN THE NFL (1998) (documenting the criminal actions of dozens of NFL players).
126.
See id.; see also Greenberg Traurig, supra note 115 (containing a twenty-one
page list of players arrested in the previous eight years).
127.
Bob Carter, Lewis Knows Super Bowl Tragedy, Triumph, ESPN.COM,
http://www.espn.go.com/classiclbiography/s/LewisRay.html.
128.
See generally id. The extent of his popularity is exemplified by the fact that, at
the end of the previous season (1999-2000), he had received two of the highest awards in
professional football: selection to his third-straight Pro Bowl (which coincidentally was to
be played only one week after his arrest) and to the AP All-Pro first team for the second
straight year. Ray Lewis Official Website, http://www.raylewis52.com/stats.shtml (last
visited Sept. 26, 2008).
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Subject to the previous policy, Lewis was fined, but not suspended for
12 9
even a single game.
Lewis was certainly not the only player who has caused harm
to the league's reputation, as numerous other NFL players have also
130
received media coverage for their run-ins with law enforcement.
However, despite all of this bad press, there has been no adverse
impact on revenue or loss of patronage; quite to the contrary, 2007
marked the fifth year in a row that the NFL set a new paidattendance record. 131 Thus, it could be that future instances of player
misconduct will similarly have little effect on the opinions of fans or
132
potential fans and profits will continue to increase.
Opponents of the policy could also claim that punishing players
for their harm to the NFL's reputation is pointless because the NFL
has gained its popularity from what occurs between the sidelines
every Sunday, not from featuring players that serve as model citizens.
This argument allows for a distinction to be drawn between
reputational harm to the NFL and the behavior at issue in cases
where the commissioner's authority has been challenged and
subsequently upheld.1 33 The former instances generally involved
conduct that, while technically occurring off the field, was of such a
nature that it could have had an adverse impact on the competitive
balance of the sport.1 34 On the other hand, a player's off-the-field
actions that do no more than make the league appear foolish are
arguably too attenuated from the game itself to have any impact on
what occurs on the playing field. Consequently, one could assert that
these actions will have no adverse effect upon the size of the NFL's fan

129.
See Carter, supra note 127; Greenberg Traurig, supra note 115.
130.
See Greenberg Traurig, supra note 115.
131.
NFL Sets Regular-Season Paid Attendance Record, NFL.COM, Jan. 3, 2008,
http://www.nfl.com/news/story;jsessionid=AF4D3B22C7A59A3DF3D2ACA800E9C944?id=O
Attendance
[hereinafter
9000d5d805b5d53&template=without-video&confirm=true
Record].
132.
Contra supra text accompanying note 113.
133.
See, e.g., Charles 0. Finley & Co. v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527, 539 (7th Cir. 1978);
Atlanta Nat'l League Baseball Club, Inc. v. Kuhn, 432 F. Supp. 1213, 1226 (N.D. Ga. 1977);
Milwaukee Am. Ass'n v. Landis, 49 F.2d 298, 303 (N.D. Ill. 1931).
134.
See Charles 0. Finley & Co, 569 F.2d at 531 (MLB commissioner's decision to
void a sale of players because he believed that it would deter expansion of the game and
posed a great danger to fair competition); Atlanta Nat'l League Baseball Club, Inc., 432 F.
Supp. at 1217 (MLB commissioner's suspension of an owner for persistently disregarding
the rules surrounding proper conduct in the pursuit of free agents); Milwaukee Am. Ass'n,
49 F.2d at 303 (MLB commissioner's refusal to approve a player's contract in order to
prevent an owner from monopolizing that player's talent and preventing him from entering
the free agent market).
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base because the strength of its ultimate product-the games that
135
fans pay to watch-will not diminish.
While these counterarguments make valid points, the fact
remains that the deluge of bad press received by the NFL during the
2006-07 season was unprecedented. 136 This period was not marked
with a single high-profile incident, but was rather marred by an
almost endless cycle of arrests, accusations, and other legal
problems. 137 While an individual player's indiscretions (such as those
of Ray Lewis) may make little difference to the public, a slew of bad
actions creates the appearance of an emerging pattern of behavior
that shifts the focus away from individuals, and instead reflects on the
character of the league as a whole.1 38 Furthermore, it is certainly not
unreasonable to assume that the pervasiveness of this negative
publicity could have actually had an impact on the mental states of
other players, and therefore the negative publicity may not have been
as attenuated from the game itself.13 9 Nonetheless, and regardless of
any impact on fair competition, the cumulative effect of this
misconduct could be viewed as a serious danger to the credibility of
the league and a threat to its future viability.140
In light of these considerations and the tremendous deference
afforded to other league commissioners, 141 it does not appear that the
new policy's provisions allowing NFL Commissioner Roger Goodell to
protect the NFL's reputation by imposing sanctions, even where there
has been no conviction or violation of a separate league rule, surpass
the power granted to him. 142 However, having the ability to punish
this type of behavior does not empower the commissioner to punish a
player to any extent imaginable. 143 On the contrary, the commissioner

135.
136.

See supra text accompanying note 113.
See, e.g., Maske & Carpenter, supra note 14.

137.
Id. ("At least 35 NFL players [had] been arrested [in 2006] on charges ranging
from disorderly conduct to felony burglary.").
138.
Id. ('Absolutely it's a reflection of the players and a reflection on the
organization."') (quoting San Diego Charger's General Manager A.J. Smith).
139.
See, e.g., NFL 2007: No More Alibis. Bengals Need to Stay Out of Trouble to Get
Back into Playoffs, ESPN.COM, Aug. 30, 2007, http://sports.espn.go.com/espn
/wire?section=nfl&id=2998396 (noting that the extensive publicity received during the
arrest-riddled 2006 season was cited by coaches as a possible reason for the Bengals' poor
performance on the field that year).
140.
See Maske & Carpenter, supra note 14.
141.
See discussion supra Part II.B.
142.
See CONDUCT POLICY, supra note 27.
143.
One could make an argument that the appeals provisions of the CBA evidence
an intention to give the commissioner absolute authority over discipline. Cf. CBA supra
note 66. However, when the CBA was amended in 2006, the new policy could not possibly
have been foreseen. Cf. NFLPA.com, NFL Players Association - About Us, supra note 25.
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is constrained by the expectation that he will be impartial in the
execution of his duties, which requires that all rules be applied
uniformly and all personnel be treated equally with respect to their
vulnerability to disciplinary action. 144 Furthermore, as a man of
"unquestioned integrity," the NFL commissioner should not only be
impartial but should be fair as well. 145
For the commissioner to remain both impartial and fair in the
course of punishing NFL employees, the punishments imposed should
be narrowly tailored to the underlying offense. Thus, if the offense is
146
classified as conduct detrimental to integrity and public confidence,
the resulting punishment should not exceed that which is necessary to
restore the integrity or public confidence endangered or lost by a
player's actions. In other words, and consistent with the previously
articulated interpretation of the integrity and public confidence
clause, 147 the punishment should be proportional to the potential loss
of fan support caused by the player's misconduct.
However, an
analysis of the punishments imposed under the current policy leads
one to the realization that this proportionality is nowhere to be
found. 148 Adam "Pacman" Jones' suspension serves as an illustration
of both the unfair results that the new policy has produced, and the
existence of double standards that demonstrate a lack of the requisite
149
impartiality.
Assuming that Jones' actions could have actually had an
adverse effect on fan support for the NFL, disciplinary actions taken
by the previous commissioner cast considerable doubt upon whether a
year-long suspension was actually warranted for his behavior.1 50 In
2004, for instance, running back Jamal Lewis, who at the time was
playing for the Baltimore Ravens, pled guilty to conspiracy to possess
and distribute cocaine after using a cell phone to try to set up a drug
Moreover, the letter that the NFLPA sent to the commissioner after Jones' suspension was
announced indicates that while the commissioner will be regarded as the final authority on
disciplinary matters, he is expected to exercise his authority in a fair and consistent
manner. Cf. Wyatt, supra note 51 (noting that Jones' attorneys "made it clear that a
lawsuit is possible if the suspension is not reduced.").
144.
See generally LAW OF SPORTS, supra note 53, § 4.19 at 443.
145.

LEAGUE CONSTITUTION, supra note 65 at art. VIII, § 8.1; see also TREAT, supra

note 1, at 681 ("Bert [Bell] was a strong man and an intelligent one, and, above all, a fair
man." (citing TEX MAULE, THE PROS (1960) (emphasis added).
146.
See CBA, supra note 66, at art. XI, § l(a).
147.
See supra text accompanying note 113.
148.
See infra text accompanying notes 151-172.
149.
Cf. Bell, supra note 19.
150.
See e.g., Greenberg Traurig, supra note 115; see also Wyatt, supra note 51
(noting that the NFLPA had expressed concern regarding the disparity between Jones'
suspension and those imposed by players under the previous policy).
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deal, and, as a result, was sentenced to four months of the off-season
in federal prison.1 51 His legal troubles were highly publicized due to
the fact that he was one of the league's marquee players, but he was
only suspended for two games of the following season.' 52 Moreover, as
previously noted, Ray Lewis' popularity could not have been any
higher when he was arrested and tried for murder, yet he was only
fined by the commissioner and did not miss a single game. 15 3 In spite
of the negative publicity received for both of these highly publicized
legal battles, there was no tremendous media or fan backlash against
the NFL for being too lenient; rather, the NFL, as stated above,
became even more popular as it continued to set attendance records.15 4
Thus, if a two-game suspension and a fine were sufficient to rectify the
harm inflicted upon the NFL's reputation by one premier player's
drug-dealing conviction and another's murder trial, a yearlong
suspension appears unnecessary to make the American public forget
55
what "make it rain" means. 1
In spite of this obvious disparity, each commissioner has his
own set of unique values, so it might be unfair to condemn
Commissioner Goodell's choice of punishment merely because it did
not comport with those imposed by his predecessor.
Perhaps
Commissioner Goodell is merely trying to set his own precedent, as he
may truly believe that these penalties must be imposed to protect the
NFL's image and ensure that the league continues to be highly
regarded by the public at large. 156 However, the validity of this
argument becomes dubious at best when Jones' suspension is
compared with subsequent punishments under the policy, such as the
suspension of Terry "Tank" Johnson that occurred during the same

151.
See id.; see also Deal: Lewis' Sentence to be Served in Offseason, ESPN.COM,
Oct. 8, 2004, http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=1897106 [hereinafter Lewis'
Sentence to be Served in Offseason].
152.
Lewis' Sentence to be Served in Offseason, supra note 151. He had just broken
the single-game rushing record and finished the season less than fifty yards away from
breaking the single-season rushing record. See NFL Records, http://www.nfl.com/history
/randf/records/indiv/rushing (last visited Sept, 26, 2008).
153.
See supra text accompanying notes 128-129.
154.
Attendance Record, supra note 131.
155.
Cf. Greenberg Traurig, supra note 115; Hruby, supra note 20.
156.
See, e.g., Bell, supra note 19 ("In issuing the suspensions ... Goodell said he
was protecting the NFL's integrity."); Maske & Carpenter, supra note 14 ("[S]ome league
officials are concerned that the repeated reports of player arrests could alienate fans and
drive away sponsors of what has become by far the nation's most popular and prosperous
sports attraction."); Wilner, supra note 30 ('We hold ourselves to higher standards of
responsible conduct because of what it means to be part of the National Football League."')
(quoting NFL Commissioner Roger Goodell).
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season. 157 Johnson, who had actually been incarcerated for two
months during the off-season for violating his probation by illegally
possessing firearms, was only suspended for eight games. 158 Jones, on
the other hand, had not been convicted of any offense, but was still
suspended for a full year. 159 From an objective standpoint, the fact
that Johnson spent time in jail, in addition to the nature of Johnson's
offense, would make Johnson's transgression at the very least equal
1 60
to, if not more severe than, Jones' transgressions.
The disciplinary treatment of Bill Belichick, head coach of the
New England Patriots, provides another enlightening comparison
between Jones' suspension and another precedent set by
Commissioner Goodell. 161 Belichick was fined, but not suspended, for
having an assistant coach use a handheld camera to steal another
team's defensive signals during a game. 162 While Jones' actions may
have embarrassed the league, it is hard to imagine that any off-thefield behavior could be more damaging to the public's perception of the
NFL than a belief that the game itself does not represent fair
157.
See Bell, supra note 19; see also Larry Mayer, NFL Announces Tank Johnson
Suspension, CHICAGO BEARS.COM, June 4, 2007, http://www.chicagobears.com/news
/NewsStory.asp?story-id=3492. Additionally, Brandon Marshall of the Denver Broncos
recently received a mere three-game suspension after his arrest stemming from domestic
violence allegations as well as other alcohol-related incidents, including an arrest for
driving under the influence. Marshall Gets Three-Game Suspension for Violating Conduct
Policy, ESPN.COM, Aug. 6, 2008, http://sports.espn.go.com/nflnews/story?id=3520985.
While this may not demonstrate a pattern of behavior similar to that of Jones, it seems
that, with the bar set by the suspensions of both Jones and Henry, the commissioner
should have been expected to discipline Marshall more severely. Id. But see John Clayton,
Marshall's Appeal Successful as Suspension Reduced to One Game, ESPN.COM, Aug. 28,
2008, http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=3558702 (noting that Brandon Marshall
was able to have his three-game suspension reduced to one game after winning his appeal
of the discipline imposed by Commissioner Goodell).
158.
See Mayer, supra note 157.
159.
See Bell, supra note 19.
160.
The fact that Johnson's charges involved firearms could clearly be seen as
making his offense even more damaging to the NFL's reputation, especially considering
that his legal troubles took place in the wake of the tragic murder of Denver Broncos'
Cornerback Darrent Williams. See Kirk Mitchell & Bill Williamson, City, Team, Kin Reel
from Brutal Killing, DENVER POST, Jan. 1, 2007, available at http://www.denverpost.com
Ibroncos/ci_4931937. Before Johnson was suspended by the League in June 2007, Professor
Rick Karcher noted that if Johnson were suspended for less than one year it "would
definitely strengthen [Jones's] argument that it's arbitrary ....

[T]he commissioner is

setting a precedent here. It's just that he jumped so far to make it a year, and now it's like
here's the starting point. I'd be surprised if [Johnson] got less than a year." See
Symposium, Regulation of Coaches' and Athletes Behavior and Related Contemporary
Considerations,4 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. CONTEMP. PROBS. 141, 152 (2007) [hereinafter
Symposium].

161.
See Dave Goldberg, Patriots,Belichick Fined for Spying, DENVER POST, Sept.
13, 2007, available at http://www.denverpost.com/ci_6887513.
162.
Id.

2008]

NFL'S PERSONAL CONDUCTPOLICY

competition because one team could possibly have an unfair
competitive advantage over its opponent. 163 Even though Belichick
was fined, the fact that Jones was suspended without pay had the
exact same financial impact as a monetary fine, but it took the extra
step of keeping him away from the game. 164 The commissioner's
willingness to permit a coach to be on the field with his team the
weekend after he is caught cheating, while at the same time
forbidding Jones from even setting foot within his team's facilities, is
strong indicia of a lack of fair dealing, and perhaps even of an
emerging double-standard in the commissioner's crusade to safeguard
the NFL's "shield. 1 65
An argument could still be made that while Jones' suspension
was severe, it was necessary because it sent a message to other
players that this sort of conduct will not be tolerated.1 66 However, this
argument misses the point: the CBA is an agreement governing the
NFL's relations with all players, not just the ones that do not get into
trouble.1 67 It cannot be that the commissioner can go beyond his
power with respect to one player as a means to upholding the good

163.

See generally John Clayton, NFL Penalty for Belichick, Patriots is Far Too

Light, ESPN.CoM Sept. 14, 2007, http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/columns/story?id=3018407;
Holmgren Supports Penalties on Patriots for Cheating, ESPN.COM, Sept. 14, 2007,
http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/wire?section=nfl&id=3020434 ("I don't want us as an
organization, or me personally, to get lumped into that kind of thinking, because we don't
do that. The rules are rules. Play by the rules." (quoting Seattle Seahawk's head coach
Mike Holmgren)); NFL Players, Coaches Weighing in on PatriotsSpying Case, ESPN.COM,
Sept. 13, 2007, http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=3017342 ("Can it cross the line?
I'm sure it can. It can give you a huge advantage." (quoting Green Bay Packers'
quarterback Brett Favre)).
164.
See supra text accompanying note 39.
165.
Wilner, supra note 30; Clayton, supra note 163; DallasAssistant Wants Goodell
to Explain Belichick's Punishment, ESPN.COM, Sept. 14, 2007, http://sports.espn.go.com
/nfl/news/story?id=3019472 (expressing concern over the emergence of a double standard).
Moreover, further evidence of a double standard can be found in the fact that Philadelphia
Eagles' head coach Andy Reid was not punished at all after his two sons were convicted of
drug-related offenses and a judge described the Reid household as "more or less a drug
emporium." Maryclaire Dale, Judge Critical of Eagles' Reid's Home, ABC NEWS.COM, Nov.
2, 2007, http://abcnews.go.com/Sports/wireStory?id=3807416; Reid Will Not Be Disciplined
for Sons' Legal Issues, ESPN.COM, Nov. 4, 2007, http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news
/story?id=3094393. While one can argue that the policy should not apply in this situation,
one would think that maintaining a "drug emporium" would nonetheless reflect poorly
upon the league, similarly to a player's misconduct. See generally Bell, supra note 19
(noting Goodell's commitment to protecting NFL's reputation); Dale, supra note 165.
166.
See e.g. Don Banks, Time to Get Tough, SI.CoM, March, 20, 2007,
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2007/writers/don-banks/03/20/nfl.discipline/index.html
(noting that "the NFL is likely to set an example with its punishment of troubled
Tennessee Titans cornerback Adam 'Pacman' Jones, suspending him even before the legal
process from a Las Vegas strip club brawl in February is complete.").
167.
See supra text accompanying notes 76-78.
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name of the rest of the league. 168 It must not be forgotten that
"deterrence, however laudable an objective, should not be achieved at
169
the expense of fairness."'
B. The Need for Independent Review
Jones' suspension illustrates the primary problem with the new
personal conduct policy: if its provisions (specifically the
commissioner's newfound ability to safeguard the NFL's reputation)
are within the scope of the commissioner's authority, then by its very
terms, he will be able to punish violations to whatever extent is
"warranted."' 70 The question then becomes, what exactly is warranted
in a given case? Once a player or employee has done something
foolish to embarrass the NFL, all that can be determined is that the
offense has harmed the league's reputation to some degree. 171 This
makes any punishment imposed under the policy the product of a
guessing game rather than a standardized procedure capable of
172
repetition.
Reviewing cases that present challenges to commissioner
authority and the opinions of various commentators could lead one to
conclude that a situation such as this-where the appropriate
punishment is difficult to quantify-presents the quintessential set of
facts for deference to the commissioner's judgment. 73
The fact
168.
When the question of disparate punishments was raised by a panel of sports
law scholars at DePaul University Law School, one of the panelists commented that "by
[the commissioner] making this statement that he wants to send this big loud message...
what you hear is ... I am stepping out of the norm, I did make this up on the fly, and I do
have a motive other than just disciplining that guy. And so it sounds arbitrary."
Symposium, supra note 160, at 152 (statement of Eldon Ham) (emphasis added).
169.
Pollack, supra note 84, at 1695-96 (quoting the arbitrator in the Howe
arbitration).
170.

CONDUCT POLICY, supra note 27, at 2.

171.
The pervasive involvement of the media substantially exacerbates the difficulty
of making this determination, as one's reputation cannot be harmed absent publicity,
which, in modern society, is substantially obtained through the mass media. While one
could say that perhaps the amount of media coverage received by an incident could be a
potential measure of damage, this shifts the focus from the culpability of the offender to a
decision by the media to either emphasize or ignore a particular event. Thus, evaluating
the degree of harm becomes a function of choices that are beyond the player's control.
172.
The policy does list factors that will be considered in determining the severity of
a punishment but included in that list are "other relevant factors." CONDUCT POLICY, supra
note 27, at 2. This omnipotent language can be interpreted to include anything and
everything, so this ultimately provides little guidance in selecting the appropriate
punishment. See generally id.
173.
Atlanta Nat'l League Baseball Club, Inc. v. Kuhn, 432 F. Supp. 1213, 1223
(N.D. Ga. 1977) (noting that the MLB commissioner was intended to have a certain degree
of leeway to choose appropriate sanctions and that judicial review of those sanctions would
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remains, however, that punishing such an amorphous harm creates a
substantial risk of abuse of discretion. If the policy contained specific
provisions that limited or qualified the commissioner's discretion, then
one could safely defer to the judgment of the commissioner 174-but no
such limitations exist and Jones' suspension indicates that a grant of
unlimited deference is simply not an appropriate solution in this
context. 175 It appears evident that Commissioner Goodell, in his
campaign to reclaim the honor of the NFL, has allowed impartiality
and fairness to fall by the wayside and has instead resorted to
draconian punishments to make examples out of the league's bad
176
apples-a practice that cannot continue.
It may well be that the commissioner is in the best position to
determine if a player's irresponsible behavior is of such an extreme
177
nature that it poses a threat to integrity and public confidence.
However, since gauging the extent of the harm caused by that
behavior is a profoundly imprecise science and has already yielded
arbitrary results, this determination cannot be left solely to the
discretion of one man. Simply put: the commissioner cannot be both
the trier of fact and the appellate judge.1 78 If (and only if) punishment
must be imposed prior to a conviction, there must be some procedure
179
put in place to reduce the potential for abuse.

present an "unworkable system"); Pollack, supra note 84 at 1706-09 (arguing that
reviewing commissioner-imposed discipline requires that the court or arbitrator substitute
his or her judgment for that of the commissioner, which is contrary to the intentions of
league founders to endow the commissioner with the sole authority over disciplinary
matters).
174.
Cf. Pollack, supra note 84, at 1709-11 (urging players' unions to trust that the
commissioner is imposing just discipline).
175.
See supra text accompanying notes 150-169.
176.
See generally Symposium, supra note 160, at 152.
See, e.g., Charles 0. Finley & Co. v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527, 538 (7th Cir. 1978);
177.
Atlanta Nat'l League Baseball Club, Inc. v. Kuhn, 432 F. Supp. 1213, 1218 (N.D. Ga. 1977);
Milwaukee Amer. Ass'n v. Landis, 49 F.2d 298, 301 (N.D. Ill. 1931). See generally,
Pachman, supra note 54, at 1437 n.176.
See Straight Out of Orwell, supra note 117 ("In one fell swoop [the
178.
commissioner] has made himself the ultimate arbiter of NFL justice, with absolute power.
. [but] power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely.").
179.
The ideal solution would be to return to the previous policy and simply reserve
judgment until the criminal justice system has run its course. Cf. Straight Out of Orwell,
supra note 117, Goodell's No Lawyer, supra note 119. This would remove the uncertainty
associated with determining the damage done by a player's actions and would also retain
the presumption of innocence forgotten by the policy. Cf. Straight Out of Orwell, supra note
117; Goodell's No Lawyer, supra note 119. Moreover, requiring a conviction negates the
possibility for abuse as the commissioner would be precluded from punishing a harm that
in reality might not have occurred in the first place. Cf. Straight Out of Orwell, supra
note117; Goodell's No Lawyer, supra note 119.
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The most effective check on the commissioner's authority would
be the establishment of an arbitration proceeding to review
commissioner-imposed discipline.18 0 This review should take the form
of an appeal and should only be allowed for punishments based solely
upon harm to the league's reputation (in other words, when there has
been no judgment rendered in the criminal justice system).1 81 Because
of the subjective nature of reputational harm, this proceeding should
be conducted by a tribunal consisting of multiple arbiters in order to
have greater sampling of opinion regarding the severity of the conduct
at issue in relation to the punishment imposed. Though the "arbitrary
or capricious" standard has frequently been employed by the courts, it
is not stringent enough for these circumstances, as the goal of this
proceeding should be to provide meaningful review rather than merely
to rubberstamp the commissioner's decision.18 2 Instead, the reviewing
body should utilize a reasonableness standard that would permit both
flexibility and a proper balancing of the respective business and
18 3
individual interests at stake.
The purpose of implementing a tribunal of this sort is not to
usurp the commissioner's disciplinary authority, but rather to prevent
him from imposing discipline behind the veil of absolute impunity that

180.
While judicial proceedings or arbitration would both satisfy this purpose,
considerations of judicial economy would most likely lead to a preference for arbitration.
See Conway, supra note 82, at 1070-71.
181.
One suggestion has been that an external tribunal should be entrusted with
deciding matters traditionally within the commissioner's disciplinary authority. Id. at
1070-71. Within this framework, the commissioner would serve only a prosecutorial role
rather than that of both prosecutor and adjudicator. Id. at 1071. However, the downside to
having this trial-like proceeding is that it could have a potential chilling effect on the
commissioner's decision to take action with regard to particular behavior. Moreover, if the
initial decision to punish is taken away from the commissioner, the commissioner's role
would be greatly diminished and his power diluted. Contrarily, an appellate proceeding
preserves his role as disciplinarian while providing an effective check on that authority.
See infra text accompanying note 185.
182.
Compare Charles 0. Finley & Co. v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527, 539 n.44 (7th Cir.
1978), with Straight Out of Orwell, supra note 117 ("[T]he commissioner will be considered
an arbitrator and that [is] a very deferential standard of judicial review. So, absent gross
misconduct no punishment would be likely to be overturned by the civil courts." (quoting
Vanderbilt University Law School Professor Robert Covington)).
183.
John C. Weistart, Player Discipline in Professional Sports: The Antitrust Issues,
18 WM. & MARY L. REV. 703, 722 (1976). Weistart argues that the use of this standard
would curtail the possibility that the "league's concern for protecting its public image
[could] easily be corrupted into rules which regulate player conduct having little connection
with what occurs on the field." Id. This reasonableness standard would consider a
multitude of factors, including the prior practice of the NFL, practices of other leagues,
testimony of fan and players reactions to similar misconduct, the availability of less
restrictive means of controlling this behavior, and the impact of the rule upon those who
are disciplined. Id. at 724.
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has been created by the appeal provisions of the CBA.18 4 It would still
allow the commissioner to use his personal judgment in determining
that particular misconduct has harmed the league's reputation and in
imposing whatever punishment he believes to be warranted in a given
case. However, the knowledge that his decisions will be subject to
further review should help to prevent, or at the very least, deter him
from abusing his discretion. This tribunal would therefore do nothing
to disturb the historical role of the commissioner as the sole authority
in disciplinary matters, while at the same time ensuring that players
and other employees disciplined for harming the NFL's image are
treated fairly and that their offenses are evaluated from an impartial
18 5
perspective.
IV. CONCLUSION

It is an inescapable reality that the National Football League is
first and foremost a business, and that its success is entirely
dependent upon its ability to increase its share of the market for
professional sports. As the league's history demonstrates, it is the
commissioners who have been instrumental in ushering the NFL from
its humble beginnings to its current prominence and position atop the
world of sports. This status is the direct result of the risks taken by
past commissioners in quickly responding to changing times and
circumstances, such as Bert Bell's optimistic view of the future of the
television market and Pete Rozelle's belief that one professional
football league would yield greater profits than two competing
leagues. Now, NFL Commissioner Roger Goodell has responded to a
perceived increase in player misconduct and implemented a
preemptive conduct policy that permits punishment prior to a finding
of guilt in the criminal justice system. His rationale is that such a
policy will put an end to this behavior, stem the rising tide of negative
publicity, and ultimately result in a better financial position for the
league.
A firm approach to player discipline may in fact be the only
way to accomplish these goals, but a man of "unquestioned integrity"
should not confuse a firm approach with an unfair or arbitrary one.
Such a man would also be wise to remember that regardless of any
strategic business decisions made over the years, the NFL enjoys its
See CBA, supra note 66, at art. XI, § 1(a).
184.
See generally Pachman, supra note 54, at 1420 (noting that a reviewing body
185.
should be mindful of the intention of the founders of sports league governance systems
while explaining that this mindfulness must be considered in light of the fact that
commissioners should not have unbridled discretion).
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current popularity because of the individuals who play the game.
Consequently, this requires that a balance be struck between the NFL
as a business on the one hand and the NFL as a composition of
individuals on the other. The manner in which this new conduct
policy has been applied, however, exemplifies the fact that the
commissioner has ignored this dichotomy and has instead tilted the
scale in favor of corporate interests.
While players who pride themselves on being upstanding
citizens may indeed want to dissociate themselves from those who are
engaging in irresponsible behavior, they must nonetheless consider
the long-term consequences of their acquiescence in this expansion of
the commissioner's powers. According to a literal reading of the
policy, almost all off-the-field behavior could come within its scope.
Even though the policy is still in its infancy, the slippery slope has
already started to run its course and will persist unless something is
done to stop it. The NFLPA and the players themselves must not
docilely stand by and allow the rights of some members of the league
to be trampled for an illusory increase in league revenues while others
are granted immunity because of their good standing with the
commissioner. At the very least, they must use their strength through
collective bargaining to demand that some procedure be instituted to
check the commissioner's authority. The NFL's players are the heart
and soul of the league, and while that fact does not necessarily imply
that they should be pampered or afforded special treatment, it should,
if nothing else, entitle them to a degree of fairness from those who
reap the benefits of their abilities, and perhaps some loyalty as well.
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